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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

found Urbano used the surface water unreasonably, because the water
could have been diverted without adversely impacting Agnello.
Second, the court discussed the quiet title claim. The court found
Agnello's expert witness offered more credible evidence than
Urbano's expert witness. Therefore, the court held in favor of Agnello
on the quiet title claim. Additionally, Agnello claimed Urbano
trespassed on her land. The court concluded Urbano had trespassed,
finding Agnello owned the property, Urbano intruded on the land by
intentionally placing materials on the property, and the intrusion
caused direct injury to Agnello. The court refused to award damages
on the trespass claim.
Finally, Agnello claimed easement title based on an easement
conveyed by deed, easement by implication, and easement by
prescription. Agnello produced her property deed, which specifically
mentioned an easement right. The court found Agnello presented
adequate evidence to prove an express easement for "ingress and
egress" purposes. Next, the court stated the factors for easement by
implication-"the intention of the parties and whether the easement is
reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the
Moreover, Agnello established easement by
dominant estate."
prescription by proving adverse possession. Agnello proved the open
visibility of the easement, the uninterrupted use of the easement for
fifteen years, and thus possessed a claim of right.
In conclusion, the court ruled in favor of Agnello and ordered
Urbano to install a drainage system to divert surface water into the
public storm drain system and to cease interference with the easement.
Susan Curtis

ILLINOIS
Nottolini v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 782 N.E.2d 980 (IM.App. Ct. 2003)
(holding that a water-filled quarry is not of natural origin, and
therefore is not a lake).
In 1999, Alecia, Cheryl, and Rick Nottolini ("Nottolinis") filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court of Kane County for a declaration of
their rights to make reasonable use and enjoyment of the surface
The
waters of an abandoned, water-filled quarry ("Quarry").
Nottolinis also requested a permanent injunction to bar the Quarry
owner, William Dwyer ("Dwyer"), from maintaining any fences and
barriers around the Quarry that would restrict their access to it. Dwyer
counterclaimed for a declaration of his exclusive rights to the Quarry.
The court held for the Nottolinis, and denied Dwyer's counterclaim.
Dwyer appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District,
claiming that the circuit court was mistaken in defining the Quarry as a
lake. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case back to the
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circuit court, with instructions to enter ajudgment in favor of Dwyer's
counterclaim, awarding Dwyer exclusive rights to the Quarry.
In 1925, LaSalle National Bank acquired title to the abandoned,
water-filled limestone Quarry in South Elgin, Illinois. Dwyer is the sole
beneficiary of the trust that includes title to the Quarry. Until a 1997
drowning, Dwyer permitted adjacent landowners to use the Quarry for
swimming.
Following the drowning, Dwyer prohibited further
recreational use of the Quarry, and requested that adjacent
landowners erect fences around the Quarry to prevent unauthorized
access. Dwyer also erected his own fences where adjacent landowners
had not.
In Illinois, if a body of water rises onto a landowner's property
enough to denude it of vegetation, that portion of land is considered
part of the lakebed. If a landowner owns a portion of a lakebed, the
landowner is given the right to make reasonable use and enjoyment of
the surface waters of the entire lake. The circuit court held that the
Quarry constituted a lake, and because a portion of it rested on the
Nottolinis' property, denuding it of vegetation, the Nottolinis were
entitled to a right of reasonable use and enjoyment of the entire
surface of the Quarry.
Prior to this case, no court in Illinois had addressed the question of
whether a water-filled Quarry could be defined as a lake, nor had any
Illinois court ever defined the term "lake." The appellate court
examined the definitions of "lake" utilized by other jurisdictions, and
adopted the definition of a lake as a reasonably permanent body of
water at rest in a depression of the earth, if both depression and body
of water are of natural origin.
The appellate court then applied this definition to the facts of the
case. The Quarry was a man-made body of water, and was therefore
not of natural origin. The court could not define the Quarry as a lake,
and as a result, the Nottolinis' ownership of a portion of its bed did
not provide them with any right to use the entirety of the Quarry's
surface water.
Steven j Rypma
MASSACHUSETTS
Greater Lawrence Sanitary Dist. v. Town of N. Andover, 785 N.E.2d
337 (Mass. 2003) (holding the doctrines of preemption and essential
government function do not prohibit a municipality from regulating
an inter-municipal sanitation district to the extent the regulations do
not interfere with the sanitation district's essential functions or the
state regulatory regime).
The Greater Lawrence Sanitation District ("GLSD") sued the Town
of North Andover, its Board of health and its Board of selectmen

